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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a new approach for assessing the reliability of 
nanometer-scale devices prior to fabrication and a practical 
reliability architecture realization. A four-layer architecture 
exhibiting a large immunity to permanent as well as random 
failures is used. Characteristics of the averaging/thresholding 
layer are emphasized. A complete tool based on Monte Carlo 
simulation for a-priori functional fault tolerance analysis was used 
for analysis of distinctive cases and topologies. A full chip CMOS 
integrated design of the 128-bit AES cryptography algorithm with 
multiple cores that incorporate reliability architectures is shown.   
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
B.8.1 [Hardware]: Performance and Reliability – Reliability, 
Testing, and Fault-Tolerance. 
General terms 
Reliability. 
Keywords 
Fault-tolerant architecture, high defect density, reliability of 
submicron and nanoelectronic systems. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Modern microelectronic systems are suffering from increased 
variability in the parameters of the fabrication technology, which 
may disrupt correct operation of single devices both in time and 
space in a random way. Still, CMOS-based systems are 
manufactured with a consented lowered yield. Several 
nanoelectronic device types have been fabricated and successfully 
measured. Their fabrication process however remains at a very 
low scale. Faulty behavior of electronic devices has been under 
consideration for a long time, and has been mostly handled by 
manufacturing test of all systems aiming at detecting and turning 
down all defective parts. This approach becomes intractable in 
presence of massive defect density, where every manufactured 
system is suffering from several physical defects, or unsystematic 
variation of vital parameters. Fault-tolerant computing has offered 
solutions at different abstraction levels of the integration to 
address this problem. For example, triple redundancy (TMR) with 
majority voting has been successfully applied in industrial 
applications, mostly considering a fairly large definition of the 
system to be replicated (computer, or large parts of 
microprocessors) [1]. However, dramatically different and new 
approaches may be needed to properly address the demands of 
safety-critical systems subject to massive defect density [2]. 
2. PREVIOUS WORK 
A four-layer fault-tolerant hardware architecture 4LRA (Figure 1) 
is used in order to offer a solution to the previously presented 
reliability issues [3]. The proposed 4LRA has been applied at the 
gate, or extended gate level. It can be applied hierarchically in a 
bottom-up way, and combined with other high-level fault 
absorption techniques. The details of this architecture have 
already been presented by the authors in earlier publications [3], 
[4]. Adaptable thresholding is necessary to adapt the 4LRA  to the 
actual faulty transfer function surface as illustrated in Figures 8 
and 9 in [3]. All third layer voltage levels above threshold saturate 
the output to Vdd, whereas all signal levels under threshold 
saturate the output to ground. Static errors can be recovered 
applying the proposed circuit architecture. This work has 
extended to the study of delay faults which can also be recovered 
using the proposed 4LRA. 
A complete tool for a-priori functional fault tolerance analysis was 
developed by authors to support the development of fault-tolerant 
libraries of standard cells. It is a statistical Monte Carlo based tool 
that induces different failure models, and does subsequent 
evaluation of system reliability under realistic constraints. The 
benefit of differential circuit architectures over standard single-
ended circuit architectures has been analyzed in the case of 
complex systems using the proposed tool and methodology. 
Moreover, the analysis of reliability of different circuits has been 
undertaken starting from the simple NOR Boolean gate as 
depicted in Figure 2, where Monte Carlo (SPICE) analysis have 
been applied using the developed tool ([4], [5]). Two 
implementations of the circuits have been selected, and 
comparatively analyzed. Single-ended standard CMOS design is 
compared to differential cascode voltage switch logic (DCVS) 
which has been selected as a differential circuit technique. The 
analysis range depicted in Figure 2 is excessively large. Typically, 
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an maximal input range of 30% of probability of failure for each 
transistor is already a significant value. More complex circuits 
have been analyzed [5]. Finally, an analysis of the optimal 
granularity of the redundant blocks is presented in [5].  
 
Figure 1. – Four-layer reliable architecture (4LRA) 
3. DESIGN METHODOLOGY AND 
SAMPLE DESIGN 
In order to provide the end-user digital IC designer with a tool 
allowing the exploration of the reliability design space, an 
adaptation of the standard design-flow is necessary, which is 
supported by a command line tool that is used in two distinctive 
phases. The proposed flow is depicted in Figure 3. The software 
reliability assessment tool is used in a first phase to develop fault-
tolerant standard cells forming libraries of blocks with various 
levels of immunity to failure. Every standard cell is declined in a 
number of schematic representations, each using a different 
architecture (redundancy factor R), design style, and variable 
parameters. In a second phase the end-user designer makes use of 
the pre-developed cells and combines them according to their 
attached performance. Hence, we extend the concept of reliability 
by construction to the selection of the optimal architecture. 
The goal of the proposed design-flow lies its intrinsic 
transparency of the design complexity related to increasing 
reliability to the desired level. The designer perceives the 
development flow as similar to currently applied design-flows. 
The standard cell library is enhanced by the 
Averaging/Thresholding Cell (ATC). Several different drive 
strength versions of the ATC cell are designed and characterized. 
The design is synthesized in a standard fashion, and the resulting 
netlist is modified using a custom Perl script. After this, a 
standard back-end design flow is used. However, the optimization 
rules of the back-end design are modified to prevent logic 
optimization and critical path resynthesis. Another modification is 
ensuring that the analog bias voltage is routed as an analog signal 
without buffers. 
4. RELIABLE ARCHITECTURE 
IMPLEMENTATION – A 128-BIT AES 
PROCESSOR CORE 
A standard cell design of moderate complexity using a 90nm 
technology has been implemented in order to compare the 
efficiency of the reliable design methodology [6], [7]. The system 
consists of an implementation of the well-known Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) cryptographic algorithm using 128-bit 
keys [8]. In order to evaluate different fault tolerant architectures, 
the design has been partitioned. To minimize the I/O requirements 
external I/O interfaces have been limited to 8 bits. Separate input 
and output controllers handle the communication and store 128-
bit copies of the plaintext, cipherkey, and the ciphertext. This 
pipelining allows, simultaneous encryption, and data I/O. A 
parallel on-the-fly key generator is used to derive the in every 
round keys used in AES from the cipherkey iteratively. 
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Figure 2. Comparative analysis of a 2-input NOR gate realized 
using DCVS and standard CMOS logic for a redundancy of 
three, and a faulty averaging unit. 
The implementation consists of four encryption (encrypt) module 
cores, one key generation (keygen) module, input/output registers, 
and one additional module that has been integrated for the 
purpose of controlling induced faults. 
The full development process has been inserted into an 
established industrial design flow, involving a number of 
adaptation scripts to be developed. In order to limit the number of 
cells to be added into the standard cell libraries, a generic 
averaging and thresholding circuit (ATC) with the ability to 
accommodate three redundant units has been designed. 
Consequently, the ATC can be treated by place and route tools as 
a regular cell. 
A specific step in the development takes care of selecting circuit 
portions of appropriate size, and instantiating it according to the 
desired redundancy factor. Adding reliability feature is performed 
by the means of Perl scripts that take the output from the 
synthesizer or a preplaced netlist, and generate the final netlist for 
place and route tools (Figure 4(a)). Redundant units (layer two in 
4LRA) are placed separately as well as the ATC (Figure 4(b)). 
The ATC is realized as a standard library cell. A differential to 
single-ended version of the ATC has been selected as a way to 
keep static current below the 20µA limit that has been derived as 
the maximal current dissipation per ATC from the permitted 
overall static current dissipation, and increase linearity figures. 
The schematic of the implemented circuit is depicted in Figure 
5(a).  The cell was characterized and included in the standard 
design flow. The analog biasing voltage, Vbias is set to 300mV 
causing a static current dissipation of 18µA. The gate delay is 
equal to 280ps with a load of 6fF. Dynamic current dissipation is 
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equal to 8µA. Relative differential and integral linearity are both 
under 10% for the whole input range. The layout of the ATC is 
depicted in Figure 5(b). The unbalanced aspect ratio of the 
standard cell is due to the need to respect the regular height of 
standard cells, as well as the need to decrease the current density 
through the averager. 
 
Figure 3. Schematic flow-graph of the proposed design-flow 
incorporating pre-designed fault-tolerant standard cells 
Fault emulation has been introduced in order to provide full 
controllability over the faults to be injected into the AES core. 
The goal of the design is to demonstrate the performance of the 
proposed fault tolerant design methodology in a real design. 
Unfortunately the used 90nm design process is a commercial 
fabrication process and does not have the high defect density 
required to justify the fault tolerant design methodology. Because 
of this, artificial fault locations are inserted into the system at 
random locations. The basic circuit of the encryption core 
contains more than 5000 gates. To be able to simulate a wide 
variety of fault distributions it was decided to add 4000 fault 
locations. 
Fault insertion is performed after all the netlists have been 
modified. For the redundant architectures 4000 fault locations are 
determined with uniform spatial distribution. Two types of faults 
are supported. In a hard-0 fault, the node is driven to logic-0 by 
the addition of a AND gate whose second input is used to control 
the insertion of a fault. A hard-1 fault can be inserted by adding 
an OR gate in a similar manner. To control all 4000 faults, a shift 
register with 4000 locations is used. This organization allows any 
combination of 4000 faults to be active at any given time. 
Practical experiments will be made with 20 to 100 simultaneous 
faults. 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4. (a) Design-flow and (b) conceptual view of the 
corresponding triplication and averaging/thresholding 
connection schemes, where the ATC is conceived as a 
standalone standard cell library component. 
 
(a) 
(b) 
Figure 5. (a) Schematic and (b) layout of the ATC. 
The manufactured chip supports four separate incarnations of the 
encryption core. The first core is a straightforward implementation 
of the encryption (Vanilla). It has been optimized to run at 250 
MHz and is able to reach a throughput of 2.9 Gb/s. However, the 
8-bit I/O interface limits the throughput to 2.0 Gb/s. The second 
core uses the well-known majority voter approach (MAJ). Each 
gate in the netlist is triplicated and a simple two-out-of-three 
majority voter is added. This new netlist is generated 
automatically from the synthesized netlist. For the majority voter a 
standard cell that implements the functions Y = AB + CD + EF is 
used, where A and C, B and E, as well as C and F are connected 
together. The third core implements the proposed multi-level fault 
tolerant architecture (RBS1). In this version a simplified model is 
used, where the logic layer consists of a single logic gate. Similar 
to the majority voter circuit the synthesized netlist is automatically 
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modified. First each gate is triplicated, then the specialized ATC 
cell is instantiated. The last core is once again a standard 
implementation (AESF). However, it also includes the artificial 
emulated fault locations. Note that, for each gate in the original 
netlist there are three gates in the redundant architecture. 
Therefore in some cases multiple faults in the redundant 
architecture map to a single fault in this architecture. In total, the 
redundant architectures have 4000 fault locations, while this core 
has only 2668. 
The critical component in this design is the ATC cell. Our first 
version of the ATC was designed as a proof of principle and was 
designed as a standard cell that is compatible to the rest of the 
standard cell library and was not optimized for speed and area. As 
a result there are noticeable delay penalties for the core that uses 
the ATC cell. The maximum operating frequency is limited to 66 
MHz. The cell also has a significant area overhead, which is an 
implication of the need to decrease the power dissipation of the 
current-based cell. A redesign of the ATC is envisioned to 
significantly reduce both the delay and the area.  
Integrating figure results are summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1. Integration result figures. 
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The analysis of the maximal fault densities for each integrated 
cores is given in Table 2. 
Table 2. Overall fault rates 
Module Faults/µm2 Faults/total gates 
RBS1 0.019 0.2 
MAJ 0.034 0.2 
AESF 0.073 0.29 
 
The test chip has 27 I/O pins and occupies 1.5x1.5mm total area 
out of which 0.7mm2 is core area. The total number of gate-
equivalents is  67000 gates. The chip functional breakdown is 
presented in Figure 6(a), and the final chip layout is depicted in 
Figure 6(b). No restriction has been assigned to the exact position 
of the four cores, which spread over the full area. 
The critical path delay for cores Vanilla and AESF is 
approximately equal to 4ns, is 6ns for MAJ, and for RBS1 is over 
15ns due to a slow ATC cell implementation, that are common in 
the path. Over 90% of the ATC cells have x4 drive strength, 
which means that most of the ATC cells are driving at least three 
redundant gates. The ATC cell has also a significant impact on 
size which makes the RBS1 core approximately twice larger then 
the MAJ core. Extra hardware logic included for fault emulation 
(AND/OR gates) and additional wiring occupy 1.7% of the total 
useful area in each core. 
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Figure 6. (a) Final cores layout figures, and (b) layout of the 
integrated circuit. 
5. REFERENCES 
[1] J. von Neumann, Probabilistic Logic and the Synthesis of 
Reliable Organisms from Unreliable Components, Automata 
Studies, Princeton University Press, 1956. 
[2] S. Roy and V. Beiu, Multiplexing Schemes for Cost-
Effective Fault-Tolerance, 4th IEEE Conference on 
Nanotechnology (IEEE-NANO), pp. 589-592, Aug. 2004. 
[3] Schmid and Y. Leblebici, Robust Circuit and System Design 
Methodologies for Nanometer-Scale Devices and Single-
Electron Transistor, IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale 
Integration (VLSI) Systems, Vol. 12, No. 11, pp. 1156-1166, 
Nov. 2004. 
[4] M. Stanisavljevic, A. Schmid, and Y. Leblebici, A 
Methodology for Reliability Enhancement of Nanometer-
Scale Digital Systems Based on A-Priori Functional Fault-
Tolerance Analysis, Proc. IEEE IFIP VLSI-SoC, October 
2005. 
[5] M. Stanisavljevic, A. Schmid, Y. Leblebici, Fault-Tolerance 
of R Publication obust Feed-Forward Architecture Using 
Single-Ended and Differential Deep-Submicron Circuits 
Under Massive Defect Density, International Joint 
Conference on Neural Networks, July 2006. 
[6] Publicly available parameters for the IBM 90nm technology 
http://www-03.ibm.com/chips/asics/products/stdcell.html 
[7] T.  Schafbauer,  et  al., Integration of high-performance, low-
leakage and mixed  signal  features  into  a  100 nm CMOS 
technology, 2002 Symposium on VLSI Technology, June 
2002. 
[8] Advanced Encryption Standard, Federal Information 
Processing Standards 197 (FIPS 197), National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), November 2001.
 
